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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
DEAN W. CROWTHER, 
Plaintiff-Appellee 
vs. 
Utah Court of Appeals #930446-CA 
BRYAN MOWER, 
Defendant-Appellant 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Statement of the Issues: 
1. Whether the trial court erred by granting Appellee's motion for summary 
judgment when there was clearly a material factual dispute as to whether 
Appellant's mother intended to presently deliver the quitclaim deed that she 
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sent via certified mail from Utah to Appellant while he was in California, and 
that such deed was on its face an absolute conveyance, in light of the fact that 
if a factfinder ruled that there was a present intent to transfer the deed on her 
part, this would have had the legal effect of destroying the joint tenancy with 
right of survivorship that Appellant's mother held with Appellee, and thus 
would make Appellant and Appellee tenants in common with respect to the 
property, and terminate the possibility that Appellee would take the entire 
property through Appellee's former right of survivorship when Appellant's 
mother died. 
2. Whether the trial court erred by summarily ruling that a deed not recorded 
by a grantee does not convey to the grantee the grantor's ownership interest in 
the property that is the subject of the deed, and thus does not destroy a joint 
tenancy with right of survivorship until the deed is recorded. 
3. Whether the trial court erred by summarily granting Appellee attorney's fees 
even though Appellant was named as the defendant in Appellee's action to 
quite title, and Appellant merely showed up in court to argue why Appellant's 
deed, conveyed from his mother to him was valid, and Appellant made this 
argument in good faith, and defended it very well by both fact and in law. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
The standard of review for whether a summary judgment was properly 
granted (and which is therefore, the standard of review for #1, 2, and 3 issues) 
is explained in Rule 56 of Utah Code Unannotated page 151. (1993) ". . . the 
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party against whom the judgment has been granted is entitled to have all the 
facts presented, and all the necessary inferences fairly arising therefrom, 
considered in a light most favorable to him." Case law on this matter is 
equally clear: "On review of a grant of summary judgment to a Plaintiff, the 
inquiry is whether there is any genuine issue as to any material fact, and if 
there is not, whether the plaintiffs are entitled to judgment as a matter of law." 
Thomcock v. Cook, 604 Rd 934 (Utah 1979). "In reviewing the trial court's 
ruling, we accept the facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the 
losing party. Because summary judgment is granted as a matter of law, we 
may reconsider the trial court's legal conclusions." Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 
813 P.d 104 (Utah 1991) (citing Farmers New World Life Insurance Co. v. 
Bountiful City, 803 P.d 1241, 1243 (Utah 1990). 
3 
Nature of the Case 
This is a case involving Appellee's deceased wife, Nellie Crowther, who 
while still living, destroyed that couple's joint tenancy with right of 
survivorship when she duly conveyed and delivered her interest to the land in 
question in this action by means of a quitclaim deed to her son, Mr. Mower 
(Appellant). By doing this, she created a tenancy in common by Mr. Mower 
and Appellee, which has no rights of survivorship. Appellee claims 
the quitclaim deed was invalid due to invalid delivery, which is essential in 
deed transactions. 
Course of Proceedings 
Appellee filed a complaint in Third District Court of Summit County. 
Appellee then filed a motion for judgment on the Pleadings with a supporting 
memorandum on or about February 2, 1993. Appellant thereafter, filed a 
motion for summary judgment and a memorandum in support thereof on or 
about February 19, 1993. A rebuttal memora^  :m was filed by Appellee on or 
about March 1, 1993. Oral argument before . .e David S. Young took place 
on March 8, 1993. Judge Young entered summary judgment in favor of 
Appellee, ruling that the deed in question was invalid because appellant did 
not record the deed until after Mrs. Crowther's death. The judge ordered Mr. 
Mower to pay attorney's fees in the amount of $1,300.00. 
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Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration and a motion to reconsider 
attorney's fees on or about March 17, 1993. Judge Young denied both motions 
and filed minute entry on or about April 15, 1993. Appellant filed motion for 
findings of fact and conclusions of law on or about May 10, 1993. No response 
was filed. This appeal was thereafter filed. 
Facts 
1 . Appellant Mower is the only son of Nellie D. Crowther whoidied on 
August 9, 1991 
2. Appellee was married to Nellie D. Crowther at the time of her de.ath 
and was living with her husband, Dean W. Crowther in Salt Lake City, Utah.. 
3. On December 15, 1988, Nellie Crowther signed a quitclaim deed 
conveying her interest in property located in Summit County, to wit: 
The west half of lot 17 and the east half of lot 18, Weberwild 
Estates, plat A, a Subdivision as recorded in the office of the County 
recorder of Summit County, UT. 
to her son, Bryan D. Mower, who at the time was living in Simi Valley, 
California. The deed was witnessed by her friend, Mable Hammond, and sent 
via certified mail to Mr. Mower along with a letter from Mrs. Crowther's 
attorney and a codicil to Mrs. Crowther's original will detailing her action of 
the quitclaim deed. The relevant disputed part of that letter is as fojlews: 
4. The quitclaim deed was recorded in Summit County on August 15, 
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1991 at the Summit County Court House by Bryan Mower, subsequent to 
Nellie Crowther's Death. 
Summary of Arguments 
1. The trial court erred by granting Appellee's motion for 
summary judgment because there was clearly a material factual dispute as to 
whether Appellant's mother intended to presently deliver the quitclaim deed 
that she sent via certified mail from Utah to her son, Mr. Mower, while he was 
in California. On its face, the deed conveyed absolute ownership of the therein 
mentioned property to her son, Mr. Mower. Only a factfinder's ruling that no 
valid delivery took place could cause the conveyance of the deed to be found 
invalid. 
(If the deed were ruled to be duly delivered, the deed would have the 
legal effect of destroying the joint tenancy with right of survivorship that 
Appellant's mother held with Appellee, and thus would make Appellant and 
Appellee tenants in common with respect to the property, and terminate the 
possibility that Appellee would take the entire property through Appellee's 
former right of survivorship when Appellant's mother died.) 
2. The trial court erred by summarily ruling that a deed not 
recorded by a grantee does not convey to the grantee the grantor's ownership 
interest in the property that is the subject of the deed, and thus does not destroy 
a joint tenancy with right of survivorship until the deed is recorded. The trial 
court's application of Utah's recording law was plain error. 
3. The trial court erred by summarily granting Appellee 
attorney's fees even though Appellant was named as the Appellant in Appellee's 
action to quite title, and Appellant merely showed up in court to argue why 
Appellant's deed, conveyed from his mother to him was valid, and Appellant 
made this argument in good faith, and defended it very well by both fact and in 
law. The trial court's award of attorney's fees were plain error. 
Detail of Argument 
Point I 
A Trial Court's Granting of Summary Judgment 
is Improper When a Dispute to a Material Fact Exists 
The trial court erred by granting Appellee's motion for summary 
judgment because there was clearly a material factual dispute as to whether 
Appellant's mother intended to presently deliver the quitclaim deed that she 
sent via certified mail from Utah to her son, Mr. Mower, while he was in 
California. On its face, the deed conveyed absolute ownership of the therein 
mentioned property to her son, Mr. Mower. Only a factfinder's ruling that no 
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valid delivery took place could cause the conveyance of the deed to be found 
invalid. 
(If the deed were ruled to be effectively delivered, the deed would have 
the legal effect of destroying the joint tenancy with right of survivorship that 
Appellant's mother held with Appellee, and thus would make Appellant and 
Appellee tenants in common with respect to the property, and terminate the 
possibility that Appellee would take the entire property through Appellee's 
former right of survivorship when Appellant's mother died.) 
The Supreme Court of Utah, on at least two occasions, has clearly 
stated that a grantor's intent to deliver a deed is not one of law, rather one 
of fact. In Horton v. Horton, 695 Rd 102, 106 (Utah 1984) the Court ruled: 
Delivery or its absence is a question of fact." See also: Poulson v. Poulson, 
672 Rd 97, 99 (Utah 1983). In light of these rulings by the Utah Supreme 
Court, the trial judge was clearly wrong by granting summary judgment on the 
factual issue concerning Nellie Crowther's intent to transfer ownership when 
she conveyed her property to her son, Mr. Mower. 
Nellie Crowther, Mr. Mower's mother, delivered a deed to Mr. Mower 
via certified mail that gave all her interest in the property described therein to 
Mr. Mower. However, Appellee wants to have this conveyance ruled void for 
what he claims was a lack of Nellie Crowther's intent to deliver the deed to 
Mr. Mower, again, a factual issue. 
In the Judge's minute entry in which he explains why he granted 
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summary judgment, the judge states: The court has found that there was 
lacking a present intent [by Mr. Mower's mother] to sever the joint 
tenancy!,] and thus the latter filing of the deed [by Mr. Mower] was 
ineffective to convey an interest to [Mr. Mower.] See: Minute Entry Ruling 
4-501 UCJA, p.l., attached. (Exhibit A) Because, according to the trial 
court, summary judgment was granted because of the factual finding by the 
Judge that Mrs. Crowther lacked a necessary present intent to deliver a deed to 
her son, the case should be overruled as a matter law because this clearly 
indicates that a dispute over a material factual issue was present and should 
have been decided by a fact finder after a proper trial had been held. 
In the hearing held by Judge Young on Appelleefs motion for summary 
judgment, Judge Young made several factual findings that were inappropriate 
for the granting of a summary judgment: 
1. "If it were her intent that you [own] the property[,] at [the time she sent 
you the deed,] it should have been filed immediately." (This was in reference 
to the fact the Mr. Mower did not record the deed until Nellie Crowther died.) 
See relevant hearing transcript p.6 attached. 
2. "She gave you this deed[,] but you were told not to record the deed." Id. 
p.5. (The judge was referring to a comment made by Nellie Crowther's 
attorney in a letter sent to Mr. Mower. However, the letter actually says "If 
she dies [before Appellee] you should promptly record it." Appellant asserts 
this was merely advice, or precatory language, not a condition precedent to 
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receiving ownership of the property. See letter, exhibit B, middle of second 
paragraph of the body of the letter. Also precatory language is defined as 
having the nature of prayer, request, or entreaty; " . . . conveying or embodying 
a recommendation or advice or the expression of a wish, but not a positive 
command or direction." Diver v. Hendrix, 284 P.d 1080, 1083. 
3. "I thought the letter in correspondence from the attorney said vtalk to me[.] 
[I]f she dies first, talk to me first.1" Id. p. 6. This is also in reference to the 
just mentioned paragraph in the letter described as exhibit B that the court used 
to establish Nellie had no intent to transfer ownership until Appellee died. 
Not only are these findings of material facts inappropriate in a hearing 
for a motion for summary judgment, Mr. Mower asserts they are not correct for 
these reasons: 
1. The deed was absolute on its face. And the deed is the best means 
available to establish the parties' intent. Sweeny v. Sweeny, H ^Ad 806 (Conn. 
1940). Also the deed was executed before the letter from Nellie Crowther's 
attorney was even written. 
2. The letter sent to Mr. Mower, exhibit B, by Nellie Crowther's attorney, also 
says, "Acting upon your mother's request I am forwarding the two deeds to 
you, to complete the transaction by which she transfers ownership to you. 
The return receipt will show that you have received the two deeds, in case any 
question of delivery should ever arise." (Emphasis added.) See Exhibit B 
paragraph 3.) 
10 
There was clearly a dispute between what the Appellee and the judge 
thought Nellie Crowther's intent was, and what Mr. Mower thought it was. 
The Judge seems to have blinding gone along with Appellee's initial remarks 
that the intent of Nellie Crowther was undisputed and not material—initial 
remarks which were simply ludicrous. Appellee stated: In this case your 
honor, there are no undisputed material facts. . . . there are absolutely no 
controverted facts. . . and certainly no material facts. See p.3 of the hearing 
transcript. Despite this statement by Appellee to the judge, Nellie Crowther's 
intent to transfer ownership was obviously very much disputed as established 
by Mr. Mower's reasons above, and should have been ruled upon be a fact 
finder after a proper trial. 
Moreover, by reading the judge's minute entry, it is obvious that the 
judge's granting of summary judgment turned on the judge's determination that 
Nellie Crowther had no intent to deliver the deed to Mr. Mower, her son. 
Therefore, because the granting of the motion of summary judgment turned on 
this issue, it was certainly a material fact. 
Furthermore, Appellee, in his motion for summary disposition on appeal 
states this: "The issue is whether this equivocable delivery of the quitclaim 
deed by Nellie's attorney to [Appellant] and the failure to record the same prior 
to her death constituted a valid delivery as against the joint tenant." Because 
this issue of "equivocable delivery," one of fact, by Appellee's own admission, 
the case should go to a factfinder, and should not have been summarily 
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disposed of. 
The granting of the summary judgment in favor of the appellee, 
turned on an issue of fact, not of law, therefore, the granting of the motion for 
summary judgment should be overruled because in order for a nonmoving party 
to successfully oppose a motion for summary judgment and send the issue to a 
factfinder, it is not necessary for the party to prove its legal theory; it is only 
necessary for the nonmoving party to show facts that controvert those of the 
moving party's. Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors Inc., 761 P.d 42 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988). Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, 
depositions, affidavits, admissions . . . show there is no genuine issue of 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. Utah R.Civ.P. 56(c). It has been established that the intent of Nellie 
Crowther was disputed and material. 
Point II 
A Deed Not Recorded by a Grantee Does Not Effect the 
Validity of the Conveyance Between the Grantor and the Grantee: 
Rather the Recording of a Deed is Merely to Impart Notice to a 
Subsequent 
Bonafide Purchaser for Value 
The trial court erred by summarily ruling that a deed not recorded by a 
grantee does not convey to the grantee the grantor's ownership interest in the 
property that is the subject of the deed, and thus does not destroy a joint 
tenancy with right of survivorship until the deed is recorded. 
This point is well entrenched in the United States common law: "It is 
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the rule with deeds as in the case of other instruments affecting the tile to land, 
that a deed, otherwise valid, passes title from the grantor to the grantee 
although it has not been recorded."1 The execution and delivery of a deed 
passes the estate and interest in the premises, the same as livery of seisin at 
common law.2 Recording adds nothing to its effectiveness as a conveyance; all 
that it accomplishes is to impart notice, and after its acceptance, failure to 
record the deed will not revest title in the grantor.3 Despite diligent and 
exhaustive efforts by Mr. Mower to find authority for the Court's ruling, no 
Utah case law or statutory authority has been found that points up to the 
proposition that the conveyance from Nellie Crowther to Mr. Mower should be 
ruled void because Mr. Mower did not record the conveyance until after the 
death of his mother, Nellie Crowther. 
Utah law is very clear that one who conveys an interest in property by 
quitclaim deed conveys "all right, title, interest, and estate of the grantor in and 
to the premises therein described and all rights, privileges and appurtenances 
thereunto belonging, at the date of such conveyance." Utah Code Annotated 
section 57-1-13 (1992 edition). Had the legislature wanted to limit the 
validity of transfers by quitclaim deed to only those quitclaim-deed transfers 
xManfield v. Excelsior Ref. Co. , 135 U.S. 326; Burbank v. 
Conrad, 96 U.S. 291; Warnock v. Harlow, 96 Cal 298, 31 P 166; 
Hallett v. Alexander, 50 Colo. 37, 114 P 490. All of this is 
still good law. They have all been Shepardized. 
2See 23 Am Jur d, Deeds sections 76 et seq. 
3Lake v. Weaver, 74 A 451; J.C. Engelman Land Co. v. La 
Blanco Agri. Co., 239 SW 937, 21 A.L.R. 1535. 
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that were subsequently recorded, the legislature had the ability to do so. They 
did not; creating, at least, the implication that they did not want recordation to 
be a condition upon quitclaim transfers. 
This general principle of conveyances binding the parties to the 
transaction even if they are not subsequently recorded is well stated in Bekins 
Bar V Ranch v. Beryl Baptist Church of Beryl Iron County, 642 P.d 371 (Utah 
1982). "A conveyance of real property is valid and binding between parties 
even without recordation." Therefore, the unrecorded transfer by Nellie 
Crowther to her son, Appellant, Bryan Mower, is valid even though Bryan 
Mower did not record the transfer until his mother, Nellie Crowther, died. 
Mr. Mower did not record the deed his mother, Nellie Crowther, sent 
him until she died. The judge made various erroneous legal statements about 
the legal consequences effected by Mr. Mower's waiting to record the deed: 
"If I . . . property with my wife, and I give you a deed to the property, just as 
your mother did, and then I die before that deed is recorded, by operation of 
law my property has gone to my survivor because there was never any deed 
recorded in the interim. So it has already gone to her before and then you go 
down and record your deed, you're out of luck." Hearing transcript p.6. 
Mr. Mower responded by telling the judge the following: It was 
entirely 100% up to me when I recorded this deed. I could have recorded it 
then, I could have recorded it subsequent to my mother's death, any time I 
wanted to. Again, it was [merely] at the attorney's suggestion [that I not record 
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the deed until my mother's death]." Id. p.7. Mr. Mower also stated: I don't 
think a summary disposition should be offered to the Appellee due to the fact 
that [the deed], in fact, was signed [by my mother], it is a legal document 
before the letter [that my mother had her attorney write to me] even occurred. 
Id. p.3. 
Judge Young responded: [The deed you have] is a floating deed. It is out 
there floating in the world somewhere, but it is never recorded against the 
property. And so at the time [you recorded it after your mother's death] the 
grantor no longer owned the property. . . . Now at the time you [recorded] 
your deed in this property, it had already gone from Nellie to Dean Crowther 
by her death by operation of [the] law [of joint tenancy with the right of 
survivorship.] Id. p.4. 
Judge Young was wrong because when Nellie Crowther died, the 
interest she held with Appellee as joint tenants with rights of survivorship 
terminated when she conveyed her interest in the property to her son, Mr. 
Mower. The law on this area is very clear and well rooted in American 
jurisprudence. A joint tenancy with right of survivorship is created when there 
is unity of time, title, interest and possession exist. Merrick v. Peterson, 606 
P.d 700 (Wash App. 1980). However, "Conveyance by one joint tenant of his 
or her interest severs joint tenancy, transforming it into tenancy in common, 
thereby extinguishing right of survivorship." Lyon v. Lyon, 670 P.d 272 
(Wash. 1983); Jolley v, Corry, 671 Rd 139 (Utah 1983). 
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Therefore, when Judge Young said: . . . at the time you [recorded] 
your deed in this property, it had already gone from Nellie to Dean Crowther 
by her death by operation of [the] law [of joint tenancy with the right of 
survivorship,] he was wrong. When Nellie Crowther conveyed her interest to 
her son, Mr. Mower, by a quitclaim deed that was absolute on its face as to 
giving him all her interest, Appellee's joint tenancy and right of survivorship 
was destroyed. Mr. Mower had become a tenant in common with Appellee 
when he was conveyed the property, two and 1/2 years before Nellie Crowther 
even died. 
This is true even though the deed was not recorded by Mr. Mower until 
after Nellie Crowther's death. "The intention of recording acts is to require 
persons claiming an interest in real property to record such interests as will 
give notice of their claims." Chelan County v. Wilson, 744 P.d 1106 (Wash 
App. 1987). This decision goes on to state " . . . unrecorded conveyances are 
valid as between parties." 
Moreover, Appellee asserted that Mr. Bryan Mower should not be 
awarded the property conveyed to him by quitclaim deed because there was an 
invalid delivery from Bryan Mower's mother to Bryan Mower. However, 
Appellee errs in this assertion. The deed that Nellie Crowther conveyed to Mr. 
Mower, her son, was absolute on its face: "Nellie D. Crowther grantor . . . 
hereby quitclaims to Bryan Mower grantee . . . the west 1/2 of lot 17 and the 
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east 1/2 of lot 18, Weber Wild Estates Subdivision." Nellie Crowther also had 
the deed witnessed and notarized by a Utah notary public. ("Exhibit C" hereto 
attached.) The moment she did this and sent her son, Bryan Mower, the deed, 
her interest in the above-described property ended, severing the joint tenancy 
with right of survivorship held by her and Appellee. By giving her son a deed 
that conveyed absolute ownership of all her interest in the questioned property 
on its face, Utah law recognized Bryan Mower as the sole owner of her former 
interest. Utah Code Annotated 57-1-13. And the joint tenancy with right of 
survivorship ended. The deed clearly passed beyond Nellie Crowther's "control 
or domain" as required by Utah law in order for there to be a valid delivery. 
Wiggle v. Cheney, 597 Rd 135L 1352 (Utah 1979). 
Wiggle is one of Appellee's primary cited authorities. However, a look 
at the facts clearly indicate Wiggle is not on point and supports Mr. Bryan 
Mower's assertion that title indeed passed because a valid delivery was 
effected. In Wiggle, the Court held that where, following disposition of deed, 
grantor advised her executor that his name was on a safe deposit box and 
instructed him that upon her death, he was to go to the bank where he would 
be granted access to the safe deposit box and its contents, grantor remained in 
sole possession and control in deed in question until her death and, thus, 
subsequent manual delivery of deed by executor to grantee conveyed no title to 
property described therein, or any part thereof, or any of its contents. These 
facts are a far cry from the case at hand: Nellie Crowther had a quitclaim deed 
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notarized, and witnessed, then sent the deed to her son, Mr. Mower, by 
certified mail to ensure it would be duly delivered. She lived in Utah at the 
time and so mailing the deed was the only way to deliver it to Mr. Mower, in 
California. She used the best possible delivery means available to her under 
the circumstances short of paying someone to fly to California and hand deliver 
the deed. After this delivery of the quitclaim deed that by its terms conveys 
absolutely all her ownership in the property, she retained no right to "reclaim 
or recall" her property interest, which is all she was required to do to effect a 
valid delivery. Hanns v. Hanns, 423 Rd 499, 509 (Oregon 1967). 
Had Nellie Crowther wanted to maintain control over the property until 
she died, she certainly could have deposited the deed with an escrow agent, 
which is what many people do when they want to ensure conditions are 
satisfied before deliver occurs. Chillemi v. Chillemi, 78 A.2d 750 (Md. 1951). 
Even preferred, she could have written the ostensible "conditions" right in the 
deed itself, insuring complete control until she died, which she chose not to do. 
She was well aware that this option was available to her because in another 
deed granted by her to her son also in a quit-claim fashion, she included these 
words of limitation: Nellie D. Crowther grantor . . . hereby quit-claims to 
Bryan Mower . . . Lot 7, Block 1, Rockwood Subdivision . . . Reserving, 
however, to Dean W. Crowther [Appellee] a lifetime right to occupy the 
premises." 
The only way that Mr. Mower may legally not have any interest in the 
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property would be if Nellie Crowther did not have the intent to convey her 
ownership in the property to Mr. Mower. Again, in Judge Young's minute 
entry, he focused on the fact that Judge Young believed Nellie Crowther did 
not have the intent to deliver the deed to Mr. Mower. However, this is a 
question for a factfinder, not one for a judge ruling on a motion for summary 
judgment. 
Point IH 
Attorney's Fees Are not Appropriate Unless Bad Faith Ensued 
The trial court erred by summarily granting Appellee attorney's fees 
even though Appellant was named as the Appellant in Appellee's action to 
quite title because Appellant merely showed up in court to argue why 
Appellant's deed, conveyed from his mother to him was valid, and Appellant 
made this argument in good faith, and defended it very well by both fact and in 
law. 
The trial court erred by summarily granting Appellee attorney's fees 
even though Appellant was named as the Appellant in Appellee's action to 
quite title, and Appellant merely showed up in court to argue why Appellant's 
deed, conveyed from his mother to him was valid, and Appellant made this 
argument in good faith, and defended it very well by both fact and in law. 
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-27-56 allows for attorney's 
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fees for frivolous lawsuits. Appellant's actions were meritorious: 1) Appellant 
tried in good faith to 
settle this action, but Appellee breached the settlement agreement. See 
"Exhibit D" (This exhibit is the settlement trust that Appellee as settlor would 
put the property in question into an irrevocable trust for the beneficiary, 
Appellant, Bryan Mower, and was prepared by Appellee's previous attorney); 
2) Because of Appellee's breach of the settlement contract with Appellant, 
Appellant had no reasonable alternative other than to protect his legally 
conveyed and transferred property from his mother to him; 3) It is evident 
from the legal analysis in Appellant's Motion for Reconsideration and 
Appellant's answer for Appellee's request for Summary Judgment (see attached 
pleadings) that there is ample statutory and case law to support Appellant's 
position. 
Wherefore, premises considered, Judge Young's granting of Appellee's 
motion for summary judgment should be overruled because a disputed and 
material fact was clearly present when he made his ruling, and as a matter of 
law, Mr. Mower was a cotenant with Appellee when his mother conveyed her 
interest in the property to him. The attorney's fees granted were an abuse of 
discretion because Mr. Mower's defense was asserted in good faith and was 
well grounded in both fact and law. Appellant should, therefore, prevail on all 
three issues. 
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Conclusion 
Utah law states that a summary judgment can not be granted if there is 
any genuine issue of fact. There clearly are issues of fact clearly brought forth. 
In addition, the court erred by summarily ruling that a deed not 
recorded by a grantee does not convey to the grantee the grantor's ownership 
interest in the property that is the subject of the deed in question, and thus does 
not destroy a joint tenancy with right of survivorship until the deed is recorded. 
Utah law is very clear that one who conveys an interest in property by 
quitclaim deed conveys "all right, title, interest and estate of the grantor in and 
to the premises therein. Recording only serves notice. 
Mrs. Crowther's intent was to leave her interest in the property as 
indicated by the deed, the letter from Mr. Wharton (Mrs. Crowther's attorney) 
and her own codicil (Exhibit E) to her will. 
This court should give full force and effect to all provisions of the Utah 
Laws, cited above, and reverse the District Court's original decision. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SUHHIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DEAN W. CROWTHER 
vs. 
BRYAN D. MOWER 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
RULING 4-501 UCJA 
CASE # 92-11621 
The Defendant has recently filed a "Motion for Reconsideration" arguing 
again his position that when his Mother, through counsel, sent a letter to Mr. 
Mower containing certain documents including a Quit Claim Deed herein relevant, 
that she at that time intended to sever the joint tenancy she held with her 
husband. The court has found that she did not have such present intent to do so 
as evidenced by the instructions from counsel as follows: 
As you know, your Mother wanted to be sure that you receive a 
1/2 interest in her property; her intention is to leave the other 1/2 to 
her step-children. There are two possible chain of events—either 
your Mother dies before her husband does, or she dies after he does. 
If she dies first, you should promptly, as soon as it is possible, 
record the two deeds with the respective County Recorder. If your 
step-father dies first, I would suggest you contact me (after you've 
discussed matters with your Mother), (emphasis added) 
The court has found that there was lacking a present intent to sever the 
joint tenancy and thus the later filing of the deed was ineffective to convey an 
interest to the plaintiff. 
The court thus denies the Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration. Mr. Richie 
is requested to prepare an order consistent herewith. 
Dated, April 14, 1993. 
u 
David S. Young, Judge 
c.c. to Mr. Mower, pro se, and Mr. Richie 
h 
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC. 
124 SOUTH 400 EAST • 4TH FLOOR 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
{801) 328-8891 
WATS 1-800-662-4245 
December 16, 1988 
fan Mower 
54 Acapulco Crt. 
ni Valley, California 93065 
ar Mr. Mower: 
Enclosed are the originals of three documents: a) a 
Lt-claim Deed regarding the house at 2620 Elizabeth Street in 
Lt Lake City; b) a Quit-claim Deed regarding some recreational 
Dperty in Summit County; and c) a Codicil to your Mother's Will. 
sp them in a safe place. 
As you know, your Mother wanted.to be sure that you 
ceive a 1/2 interest in her property; her intention is to leave 
e other 1/^ to her step-children. There are two possible chain 
events — 'either your Mother dies before her husband does, or 
e dies after he does. If she dies first, you should promptly, as 
on as it is possible, record the two deeds with the respective 
•unty Recorder. If your step-father dies first, I would suggest 
>u contact me (after you've discussed matters with your Mother), 
will need to know whether Dean Crowther did anything to affect 
alter the ownership or testamentary disposition of his portion 
the property, before we can decide what needs to be done with 
e Deeds. 
You will have noticed, no doubt, that this letter 
rived by Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested. Acting upon 
ur Mother's request, I am forwarding the two Deeds to you, to 
>mplete the transaction by which she transfers ownership to you. 
.e Return Receipt will show that you have received the two Deeds, 
i case any question of delivery should ever arise. A copy of this 
itter, together with the Return Receipt, is in your Mother's file 
Bryan Mower 
Page 2 
December 16, 1988 
here (our #88-02390). Earlier in this letter I asked you to keep 
the documents in a safe place -- please keep this letter with them, 
as an indication of your Mother!s intention to deliver the deeds 
and how that was accomplished. 
Please call me if any questions arise. 
Very truly yours, 
W. PAUL WHARTON 
Attorney at Law 
SENIOR CITIZEN LAW CENTER 
WPW/bj 
cc: Nellie D. Crowther 
c/o Mable Hammond 
Enclosures 
Certified Mail Receipt No.: P07 5787592 
^J 
S/Anov^ ov. &<*<*& 
When recorded , r e t u r n t o : 
($uit-<£latm Beth 
THIS IS A LEGALLY BINDING CONTRACT 
IF NOT UNDERSTOOD, SEEK COMPETENT ADVICE 
NELLIE DEE CROWTHER, Grantor, of 2620 Elizabeth 
Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84106, hereby QUIT-CLAIMS to 
BRYAN MOWER, Grantee, of 1564 Acapulco Street, Simi 
Valley, California 93065, 
for the sum of TEN DOLLARS and other good and valuable consid-
eration, the following described tract of land in Summit 
County, State of Utah: 
^The West 1/2 of Lot 17 and the East 1/2 of 
Lot 18 Weber Wild Estates Subdivision, 
r, WITNESS the hand of the said grantor this /:_YJ day 
of /('<<<>... fi..<-^ 1988. 
NELLIE DEE CROWTHER 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
ss, 
On the I S ^ day of JTXi-"-->fc^ 1988, personally 
appeared before me, a Notary Public, NELLIE DEE CROWTHER 
who proved to me her identity through documentary evidence 
the form of yyr- ^ x w^ew^e^ ^ 5 > ^ r ^ v ^ — to 
the" p^rspy^ whose name is signed on the preceding document, 
duly1acknowledged to me that she executed the same. 
in 
be 
who 
-
 4
 "-'V, i 
. ^  •. o;. •. 
*My;'Cosmmi(6SioH -expires: 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at: 
MS1 * 62G«M1S4 
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DRAFT COPY 
I. IRREVOCABLE ADDENDUM TO THE DEAN WALTER CROWTHER FAMILY TRUST 
DEAN WALTER CROWTHER as Trustor and as the Trustee hereby 
makes an irrevocable addition to the DEAN WALTER CROWTHER FAMILY 
TRUST, dated the 30th day of March, 1992. 
It is the Trustor's intent that the Trust, its provisions, 
assets, and contents, remain private, and that their be no 
disputations with respect to this ADDENDUM. If any Beneficiary 
hereunder in any manner, directly or indirectly, contests or 
attacks this ADDENDUM, or the TRUST, or any of their provisions, 
any share or interest in the Trust Estate given in this ADDENDUM to 
that contesting Beneficiary is revoked and disposition thergof 
shall be made in the same manner provided herein as if that 
contesting Beneficiary had never been named herein. 
All Personal Property is to be distributed as provided in the 
Trust. Personal Property or its value is not to be considered in 
determining the individual share of the balance of the Trust 
Estate. 
After the distribution of all Personal Property as provided in 
the Trust and its schedules, the Balance of the Trust Estate shall 
be divided and distributed: 
One Fourth (1/4) to Brian Mower if living, otherwise to his 
heirs. 
Three Fourths (3/4) to remain in the DEAN WALTER CROWTHER 
FAMILY TRUST. 
For the purpose of dividing and distributing the One Fourth 
(1/4) of the Balance of the Trust Estate, the Trustor hereby 
appoints FIRST SECURITY BANK N.A., and its successors, as Successor 
Trustee. After the division and distribution, the provisions of 
the Trust prior to this ADDENDUM are to be implemented, including 
those applicable to Successor Trustee. 
That this ADDENDUM is accepted and effected this day of 
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TRUSTOR: TRUSTEE: 
DEAN WALTER CROWTHER DEAN WALTER CROWTHER 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
FIRST CODICIL TO THE 
LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF 
NELLIE D. CROWTHER 
I, NELLIE D. CROWTHER, of Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, being at least eighteen years of age, of sound mind and 
memory, and acting under no restraint or duress of any kind, do 
hereby make, publish and declare this instrument to be the FIRST 
CODICIL to my Last Will and Testament executed on the 11th of 
August, 1987, at Salt Lake County, Utah, and do hereby republish 
said Will with the following change: 
The second paragraph of the section entitled "RESIDUARY 
LEGATEES" is revised in its entirety to read as follows: 
In the event that DEAN W. CROWTHER does not survive me, 
I give all of the rest, residue and remainder of my property, 
whether real, personal or mixed, and wherever situated, together 
with any property over which I may have power of appointment to my 
son and step-daughters, named above, as follows: I have by 
Quit-claim Deed, given to my son one-half of my home and other 
real property; I hereby give the other half of each, if I have 
received an interest by the probate of DEAN W. CROWTHER1s estate 
or otherwise, to my three step-daughters. All of the rest of my 
estate I give to the four children, share and share alike. In the 
event that one or more of my children predecease me, each deceased 
child's share of my estate shall be equally divided among that 
child's children. 
d ? ^ ao&^T £3, / W 
'^O.^'A vu.ci^e'1- • 
